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Abstract 
This study explores the state of electoral accountability at the devolved level in Wales. Holding 
those in power responsible for their performance requires that citizens assign responsibility 
accurately and vote on the basis of policy outcomes. We examine whether citizens in Wales 
can identify devolved policy competences and office holders, and identify factors that are 
linked to accurate attributions. We then identify whether voters seek to use devolved elections 
as a sanctioning tool, even if they do not have the information required to do so accurately. The 
findings indicate that there is an acute accountability deficit at the devolved level in Wales: 
few have the knowledge or the inclination to hold those in power to account. The conclusion 
discusses the implications of these findings for democracy in Wales and in other multi-level 
settings. 
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Introduction 
A key function of elections is to provide citizens with an opportunity to hold those in power 
responsible for their performance. Citizens may re-elect incumbents who have performed 
strongly and dismiss office holders who have performed poorly. Yet citizens are not always 
able to use elections to sanction in this way. For elections to work as an effective sanctioning 
tool, citizens must be able to attribute responsibility for policy performance accurately and 
those attributions must inform voting behaviour. In many settings, fulfilling these requirements 
asks a great deal of citizens. They must be able to identify which governmental institutions are 
responsible for specific policy areas and which party(s) holds power within those institutions; 
citizens must also be informed sufficiently to be able to evaluate policy performance at least at 
a rudimentary level and they must vote on the basis of these evaluations. Citizens are unable 
to use elections to hold those in power responsible for their record if they fail to identify who 
deserves the credit or blame for policy outcomes and/or fail to take government performance 
into account when voting. 
 
Two main sets of considerations relating to responsibility attributions weaken retrospective 
voting. First, institutional factors can make the task of attributing responsibility difficult for 
citizens. The dispersion of powers between levels of government in multi-level settings, and 
the sharing of power between governing parties in multi-party settings, present challenges. 
Second, due to individual-level factors, many citizens do not draw on their attributions when 
deciding how to vote even if they attribute responsibility correctly. Some voters simply do not 
take into account which political actor is responsible for governmental performance when 
voting. Others do not in practice credit or blame the political actor to which they attribute 
responsibility; bias affects the process of translating functional responsibility (i.e. who is 
responsible) into causal responsibility (i.e. who is blamed) (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a; Hobolt 
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and Tilley, 2014b; Rico and Liñeira, 2017). Many voters, it appears, fail to use their vote to 
hold those in office to account. 
 
The architects of devolution argued that creating an elected body, the National Assembly for 
Wales, would revitalize democracy in Wales by bringing government ‘closer to the people’ 
(HC Deb 22 July 1997, c757). The composition of government would be closely aligned with 
public preferences in Wales; accountability would be stronger since citizens would more easily 
be able to hold those in power responsible for government performance. However, politicians 
and commentators have long voiced concerns regarding the strength of accountability in 
devolved Wales. Concern centres on the issue of whether voters possess sufficient knowledge 
to make effective use of their vote at devolved elections. Devolution has not been undertaken 
in a way that makes it easy for citizens to understand the division of competences between 
Westminster and Wales. Constitutional change has been – and continues to be – a major feature 
of devolved politics in Wales. News coverage of devolution is of limited accuracy and 
consumption of news media created in Wales is low (Thomas et al., 2004; Cushion and Scully, 
2016; BBCNews, 2012).1 This suggests that citizens may find it difficult to identify which 
office holders should be rewarded or sanctioned come election day. 
 
In this article we investigate the strength of accountability at devolved elections in Wales. 
Specifically, we examine three issues relating to responsibility attribution and voting 
behaviour: the extent to which Welsh voters attribute responsibility accurately, the factors 
                                               
1  It is on the basis of these weaknesses in the media landscape that politicians and 
commentators have long voiced concerns regarding the strength of accountability in devolved 
Wales. Yet while limited news media consumption is a potential explanation for why there is 
an accountability deficit in Wales (if there is one), it does not provide a direct measure either 
of the degree to which people in Wales are (mis)informed or of the strength of electoral 
accountability in Wales. 
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linked to (in)accurate responsibility attributions, and whether attributions inform voting 
behaviour at devolved elections. This study adds a new dimension to our understanding of 
electoral behaviour in Wales: it provides new insights into the context in which voters develop 
political preferences and translate their evaluations of policy output into a vote choice at 
devolved elections. The study also advances understanding of the potential and pitfalls of 
decentralisation: it addresses the question of whether the UK’s relatively new constitutional 
arrangements have led to a strengthening of the link between citizens and those in power in the 
context of the devolved nation which has the most limited public sphere.  
 
The article is structured as follows. First, drawing on previous empirical studies, we discuss 
the factors that have been found to make the task of attributing responsibility more challenging 
for citizens, and develop a series of expectations relating to the Welsh context on the basis of 
these insights. Then, drawing on survey data from the 2016 Welsh Election Study (WES), we 
examine the extent to which voters in Wales attribute responsibility correctly and identify 
factors that are linked to voters’ (in)ability to attribute responsibility correctly. The study 
subsequently explores whether responsibility attributions inform voting behaviour in a bid to 
identify whether the citizens in Wales use devolved elections to reward or punish those they 
believe are in power. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for devolved 
elections in Wales, and for understanding electoral accountability in multi-level settings more 
generally. 
 
1. Investigating Responsibility Attributions and Accountability 
How citizens attribute responsibility for policy outcomes plays a crucial role in determining 
whether elections serve as an effective sanctioning mechanism. According to the retrospective 
voting model, citizens use elections to reward or sanction those in power for their performance 
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in office (Fiorina, 1981); electoral accountability is strongest when there is a close link between 
performance evaluations and vote choice. Yet the retrospective voting model relies on the key 
assumption that citizens attribute responsibility for outcomes to the appropriate political 
actor(s) and draw on these attributions when deciding how to vote. Citizens must evaluate 
policy outcomes and sanction or reward those – and only those – who are responsible for the 
outcomes in question. In other words, to hold their elected office holders to account for their 
past performance citizens must engage in ‘attribution-sensitive retrospective performance 
based voting’ (Garry, 2014, p. 87). Citizens who misattribute responsibility are liable to reward 
or sanction the ‘wrong’ office holder; voters who fail to draw on their attributions when 
deciding how to vote do not engage in retrospective voting.  
 
With these considerations in mind, scholars have examined whether and under what conditions 
citizens attribute responsibility accurately and draw on these attributions when voting. Several 
factors have been identified as making the task of attributing responsibility more challenging 
for citizens. 
 
The complexity of the institutional environment has been identified as a major factor 
undermining citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility. In systems of multi-level governance, 
responsibility is dispersed ‘vertically’ between institutions operating at different levels of 
governance, and citizens must identify at which level different functions are carried out. In 
addition to the increased information costs that citizens face in these settings, governments at 
different levels have an incentive to mislead citizens by shifting blame and taking credit 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 449). The difficulties for citizens are most acute in settings where power 
is shared between levels, along the lines of the marble cake model rather than the layer cake 
model of federalism (León, 2012; León and Orriols, 2016; Cutler, 2017). Several studies of 
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multi-level settings have demonstrated that citizens struggle to judge accurately which level of 
governance is responsible for various functions (Cutler, 2004; Gomez and Wilson, 2008; 
Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a). Even in settings where voters can attribute responsibility accurately, 
there is limited (Cutler, 2017) or no (Johns, 2011) evidence that citizens draw on these 
attributions when deciding how to vote. Evidence that responsibility judgments condition vote 
choice is restricted to highly salient issues (Arceneaux, 2006) and to highly motivated and 
knowledgeable voters (Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Gomez and Wilson, 2008; Wilson and 
Hobolt, 2015). There is considerable evidence that governmental complexity weakens 
economic voting (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2006; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 
2002). The link between responsibility attributions and vote choice is far clearer in unitary 
systems featuring single-party governments than in multi-level settings. The promise of 
decentralisation – that citizens find it easier to hold those in power to account – goes unfulfilled 
in many settings; politicians in multi-level settings appear to be ‘less, not more, accountable 
for their actions’ (Arceneaux, 2006: 731). 
 
Considerations relating to the ‘horizontal’ division of power can also complicate the task of 
attributing responsibility. Factors such as the lack of voting unity within governmental parties, 
the presence of a bicameral opposition and a strong committee system have the effect of 
dispersing power at a particular level of governance and reduces governmental clarity (Powell 
and Whitten 1993; see also Nadeau, Niemi, Yoshinaka, 2002). In multi-party systems, power 
is often shared horizontally between parties forming a coalition government. In such settings, 
citizens must not only identify which level of government is responsible for a given policy 
outcome and which parties are in government at that level, but they must also identify which 
of the governing parties bears principal responsibility for performance in that area (Fisher and 
Hobolt, 2010). Many citizens fail at these tasks (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). Citizens 
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under multi-party governments find it more difficult to hold those in power to account: 
retrospective voting is less prevalent in systems with coalition governments than in two-party 
systems which feature a clearer divide between government and opposition (Fisher and Hobolt, 
2010).  
 
Bias can lead citizens to misattribute responsibility. It can also lead citizens to identify one 
political actor as responsible for governmental performance in a given area (functional 
responsibility) yet to credit or blame another actor for those outcomes (causal responsibility) 
(Arceneaux, 2006). Predispositions, most notably partisanship, can act as a ‘perceptual screen’ 
which conditions how citizens evaluate outcomes and assign responsibility for those outcomes. 
Party supporters tend to credit their party for policy successes while shifting blame away for 
policy failures (Bartels, 2002; Rudolph 2006; Marsh and Tilley, 2010; Tilley and Hobolt, 
2011). Constitutional preference is another factor that can lead voters to engage in motivated 
responsibility attribution. Hobolt and Tilley find that ‘EU supporters are more likely to claim 
responsibility for the EU when things are going well and less likely to say that the EU is 
responsible when things are going badly’ (2014a, p. 6). Johns (2011, p. 66) finds that those 
who are supportive of Scottish independence are much more likely to (correctly) attribute 
responsibility for health to the Scottish government. It is clear that several sources of bias 
impedes voters’ efforts at assigning responsibility and blame. 
 
Political knowledge is another individual-level factor which shapes responsibility judgments. 
Most citizens know relatively little about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), and this 
can make the task of attributing responsibility difficult. Political knowledge is shaped by the 
quantity and nature of information consumed by individuals. Citizens require information 
about the institutional environment and about policy outcomes to attribute responsibility 
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accurately and to follow through on these attributions when voting (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014: 
18). Those with limited political knowledge tend to draw on cues when making political 
decisions. While these can sometimes be successfully used (Sniderman et al. 1991; Lupia, 
1994), they often mislead citizens, especially when used to help determine complex issues (Lau 
and Redlawsk, 2001; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a, p. 17; Johns, 2011, p. 57).  
 
Media consumption can assist citizens to attribute responsibility, but it can also be a hindrance; 
media reports can be inaccurate or misleading, or they can prompt individuals to draw on their 
biases (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a, ch. 5; Maestas et al., 2008). Reflecting this, empirical 
findings relating to the effect of media consumption on responsibility attributions in multi-level 
settings are mixed. Johns (2011, p. 66) finds that reading newspapers leads Scottish voters to 
misattribute devolved responsibilities to the UK level and suggests that this may be explained 
by the focus placed by the press on Westminster politics. Hobolt and Tilley (2014a, chs. 5–6) 
find that the media rarely assign credit or blame to the EU for policy outcomes and that media 
consumption does not have a general effect on the accuracy of responsibility judgments relating 
to the EU. Cutler (2017) finds that judgments are more accurate when the media clearly 
attributes responsibility for the issue in question to a particular level. The key, according to 
Cutler, is that ‘the media are structured to provide separate reporting of each government’s 
actions’ (Cutler, 2017, p. 18).2 
 
This section has drawn on the increasingly voluminous literature on responsibility attributions 
to show that citizens often find it difficult to identify which political actor is responsible for 
governmental outcomes. Institutional complexity, bias, and limited access to reliable 
                                               
2 Note also that Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) find some evidence that Dutch voters are 
better able to identify parties in government if they consume news media. 
 9 
information hinder citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility and consequently limit the 
public’s ability to hold those in power to account. The following section applies the literature’s 
findings to the context of devolved elections in Wales, and draws up a set of expectations 
regarding electoral accountability in that setting. 
 
2. Case and data 
There are grounds for expecting people in Wales to find the task of attributing responsibility 
particularly challenging. Many of the factors identified by the literature as making the task of 
attributing responsibility more onerous for citizens, apply in Wales. 
 
It is likely that public understanding of devolution in Wales has been hampered by complexities 
relating to the vertical division of powers. The task of working out the division of competences 
may not have held great appeal to citizens at the outset, since the devolved institutions were 
initially given weak powers in a limited range of policy areas. While the devolved institutions 
received some budgetary powers and the right to enact secondary legislation in 20 subject areas 
(including health and education) in 1999, they were not granted tax-raising powers or the right 
to create primary legislation. Competences in devolved areas were therefore shared between 
Cardiff and London at this time, with arrangements resembling a marble cake model of 
federalism rather than the layer cake model that citizens find easier to understand.  
 
Public understanding of devolution may not have improved over time. Devolved powers have 
been modified several times since 1999, and it is reasonable to expect that this has led to 
confusion. The first constitutional revision took the form of the Government of Wales (2006) 
Act. This Act introduced the Legislative Competence Order system, whereby the devolved 
institutions could ask the UK Parliament for permission to make primary legislation relating to 
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strictly defined issues. The power to make primary legislation in all 20 subject areas devolved 
to Wales was granted in 2011, following a lacklustre referendum which did little to educate the 
Welsh public (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012). Two successive Wales Acts in 2014 and 2017 
revised constitutional arrangements further. Both augmented devolved powers in limited ways, 
while the latter granted limited tax raising powers for the first time. Collectively, these changes 
have seen a partial move away from a shared competences model towards an arrangement that 
more closely resembles the simpler layer cake model of federalism. However, we can expect 
that the frequency, complexity and low-key nature of reforms has made it difficult for the 
public to grasp where responsibility lies. 
 
Governmental incongruence and intergovernmental conflict between administrations in 
Cardiff and London since 2010 may have further obscured the lines of responsibility. The post-
2010 period has seen open conflict between administrations at the two levels on issues such as 
government spending levels, the scope of devolved competences, and Brexit. There has been 
plenty of scope for the Welsh Government to seek to shift blame onto the national level (Scully 
and Larner, 2016, p. 512), given the UK government’s austerity agenda and the fact that the 
overall size of the devolved budget is strongly linked to the UK government’s spending 
decisions. To complicate matters further, recent years have seen election campaigning on issues 
that do not relate to the same level of governance as the election in question. State-wide parties 
have used events held in Wales during UK general election campaigns to discuss publicly 
salient devolved issues (BBC News, 2017), and discussion of issues reserved to the UK level 
(such as EU membership and immigration) have taken place during devolved elections in 
Wales (Morris, 2016). 
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Ambiguities relating to the horizontal division of powers between devolved institutions may 
also have hindered efforts to attribute responsibility. The National Assembly for Wales was 
initially established as a corporate body, with no legal separation of power between a legislative 
and an executive body, and with the institution as a whole responsible for all decisions. A de 
facto shift occurred in the early years of the Assembly, and the Government of Wales (2006) 
Act formalized the separation of powers between the legislature (the National Assembly for 
Wales) and the executive (the Welsh Government). The decision at the time of the separation 
to name the executive ‘The Welsh Assembly Government’ did little to serve the interests of 
clarity. These teething problems have left a problematic legacy: despite these changes to the 
division of powers, it is not uncommon to hear citizens blame the devolved legislature rather 
than the devolved executive for governmental performance. 
 
The horizontal division of power between parties is less clearly problematic. Labour has 
governed throughout the devolved period, either alone (1999–2000; 2003–7; 2011–16) or as 
the major coalition partner with the Liberal Democrats (2000–2003 and since 2016) and Plaid 
Cymru (2007–11). This continuity should make it easier for citizens to identify at least which 
party leads the government. This is significant because voters tend to credit or blame the senior 
coalition partner for outcomes (Fisher and Hobolt, 2010; Duch et al., 2015). Nevertheless, with 
coalition governments commonplace and Labour’s choice of coalition partner having oscillated 
between the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru in the past, citizens may struggle to identify 
the exact partisan composition of the government. 
 
Patterns of media generation and consumption do, however, provide grounds for concern 
regarding the ability of citizens to attribute responsibility on issues relating to devolved 
governance. Few people consume news created in Wales (Cushion and Scully, 2016), and 
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coverage of devolved politics in Wales by the London-based news media (widely consumed in 
Wales) is limited (Scully and Larner, 2016: 511–12) and sometimes of poor accuracy (BBC 
Trust, 2008). The Westminster-centricity of UK-wide news coverage may give a misleading 
impression of which level of government and which parties are responsible for governmental 
performance in Wales. The limited consumption of indigenous news media leads us to expect 
that attributions are less accurate and play a more limited role in electoral behaviour in Wales 
than in settings where the media landscape is stronger. 
 
In the remainder of this article we draw on data from the 2016 Welsh Election Study (WES) to 
identify whether citizens in Wales are able to attribute responsibility accurately, which factors 
are linked to their (in)ability to do so, and whether voters draw on these attributions when 
casting their ballot. WES is a three-wave panel survey conducted online by YouGov around 
the time of the devolved election, held on 5 May 2016. The pre-election wave was conducted 
between 7 and 18 March 2016, the election wave was conducted between 5 April and 4 May 
2016, and the post-election wave was conducted between 6 and 22 May 2016. A total of 2,115 
responded to all three waves, while 3,272 individuals respondend to the first and largest wave. 
Survey weights have been applied in the analysis that follows.  
 
3. Exploring attributions of responsibility in devolved Wales 
To what extent are people in Wales able to attribute political responsibility accurately? We 
investigate this issue by examining whether citizens can identify two issues: which level of 
government has responsibility for key policy areas, and the partisan composition of the Welsh 
Government in the period leading up to the 2016 election.3 
 
                                               
3 This section draws on Wave 2. 
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Before presenting the findings, it is worth noting that more than half of respondents (61.8%) 
agreed with the statement that ‘it is often difficult to figure out which level of government is 
responsible for what’. More than a third (36.9%) stated that the election campaign had provided 
them with insufficient information ‘to make an informed choice’. This provides an initial cause 
for concern about the state of affairs in Wales, given that this wave of the survey was conducted 
in the days leading up to election. 
 
At the aggregate level, respondents correctly attributed responsibility for major policy areas. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of respondents identified that responsibility for the two 
key devolved policy areas, health (64.4%) and education (58.6%), lies with the Welsh 
Government, and that responsibility for foreign policy (77.5%) and taxation (78.1%) lies at the 
UK level. There is much confusion regarding whether responsibility for law and order has been 
devolved, although a plurality (47.5%) correctly ascribed responsibility for this to the UK level. 
Despite the fairly positive general trend, a considerable proportion of the Welsh electorate – 
well over a third – is unaware that health (35.6%) and education (41.4%) are devolved 
competences. This is despite the fact that the Welsh Government spends almost half of its entire 
budget on health and that education is its third largest budgetary item (Welsh Government, 
2017).4 
 
[Table 1] 
 
To ascertain whether citizens could identify the partisan composition of the Welsh Government 
during the term leading up to the election, respondents were asked ‘As far as you are aware, 
                                               
4 Interestingly, knowledge levels were slightly lower on each measure when similar questions 
were asked a few weeks following the election in Wave 3 (other than in the case of foreign 
policy, for which there is no survey item in Wave 3). See Supplementary Material. 
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which party or parties have had ministers in the Welsh Government between 2011 and now?’ 
Respondents could select as many parties as they wished, and had 30 seconds to answer the 
question. The ‘don’t know’ option was available. 
 
Only around 1 in 6 (16.0%) could identify that Labour governed alone in the period leading up 
to the 2016 election. More than a third of respondents (39.4%) were unaware that Labour – the 
long-time dominant party in Wales – was in government at all. While nearly half of respondents 
(44.6%) identified Labour as a party of government in Wales, it appears that many citizens 
were confused about the partisan composition of the Welsh Government and/or were under the 
impression that it comprised of multiple parties: 45.7% believed that a coalition government 
was in power at the devolved level in Wales at a time of single party government. 
 
[Table 2] 
The findings obtained so far present a bleak picture. While many citizens in Wales were able 
to identify that responsibilities for key policy areas are devolved, a large minority could not. 
Even more alarming is the finding that the overwhelming majority of citizens in Wales could 
not identify the partisan composition of the single-party government. The findings suggest that 
a vast proportion of citizens in Wales do not have the knowledge required to hold those in 
power at the devolved level to account.  
 
4. Explaining attributions of responsibility in devolved Wales 
The findings presented above suggest that there is at least some, and potentially considerable, 
variation in citizens’ understanding of devolution. It appears that while some may have 
sufficient information to evaluate the performance of office holders, others may not possess 
the information necessary to evaluate incumbents when deciding how to vote. With this in 
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mind, the next task is to identify which factors are linked with citizens’ (in)ability to attribute 
responsibility correctly. This helps us to understand whether certain groups are in a stronger 
position than others to use elections as an accountability mechanism, and as a result whether 
electoral accountability is exercised only by distinct sections of the population. 
 
To this end, we report findings from a series of multivariate models that explore the predictors 
of knowledge of devolved politics (Table 3). We constructed four dependent variables. The 
first pair is based on additive scores relating to knowledge of devolved competences and the 
second pair is based on additive scores relating to knowledge of the partisan composition of 
the Welsh Government. For the dependent variable used in Model 1, each respondent was 
awarded a point for each correct answer to the question ‘which level of government is mainly 
responsible for the following policy areas?’: health, education, law and order, foreign policy, 
and taxation. The minimum score is zero and the maximum is five. The dependent variable 
used in Model 2 only draws on responses to the health and education survey items, with scores 
ranging from zero to two. Since these are two key devolved issues, the ability to attribute 
responsibility accurately in relation to these issues is a crucial indicator of how well 
respondents know which issues lie within the remit of devolved decision-makers. Model 3 
takes a binary dependent variable, which  indicates whether the respondent was aware that 
Labour was in government alone. Model 4 examines whether there are systematic differences 
between those who believed that Labour was in power alone, those who believe that Labour 
governed in coalition, and those that did not identify Labour as a governing party. The 
dependent variable divides respondents into three categories: those who identify Labour as 
governing alone score 2; those who identify Labour as being in government as part of a 
coalition score 1; and those who failed to identify Labour as a governing party score zero. The 
two pairs of models presented in this section operate at two levels of stringency, with Models 
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1 and 3 providing more demanding tests of respondents than Models 2 and 4. Since the 
dependent variables used in Models 1, 2, and 4 are counts, we estimate Poisson regressions. 
Model 3 presents a logistic regression, since the dependent variable (which identifies whether 
the respondent knew that Labour goverened alone) is binary.5  
 
We include three sets of independent variables, and the specification of the four models are 
identical. The first set presents the standard socio-demographic variables: age 6 , whether 
children are present in the household, education level, gender, housing status, marital status, 
and social class. This provides a means of testing whether older, wealthier, married, better-
educated citizens are more knowledgeable about politics in Wales as they are found to be in 
other settings. We also include an interaction between gender and living in a household without 
children to account for the difficulties respondents (and especially female respondents) who 
live in households with children may have in finding time to acquire information about politics.  
 
The second set of independent variables relates to the experience of living in Wales and to 
issues of culture and identify. We include variables relating to the respondent’s place of birth, 
Welsh language ability, and national identity, as is customary when exploring issues relating 
to public attitudes and participation in Wales (Scully and Wyn Jones, 2012). In light of findings 
that constitutional preferences are linked to attitudes and evaluations (Hobolt and Tilley, 
2014a; Johns, 2011), we also control for respondents’ constitutional preferences. 
 
                                               
5 For summary statistics, replication materials, and detailed descriptions of all variables and 
their WES codes, see Supplementary Material.  
6 We include both a squared and a cubed term for respondent age to account for potential 
differences across age groups and the likely non-linear relationship between age and political 
knowledge.  
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The third set of predictors focus on political interest, engagement and outlook. Inclusion of the 
self-reported measure of political interest enables us to examine whether those with greater 
interest in politics assign responsibility more accurately. Such a finding would suggest that 
more needs to be done not only to educate citizens about politics, but also to generate interest 
in devolved politics among the public. The dummy variable ‘Welsh media consumption’ 
indicates whether the respondent consumes any TV, radio, or print news media created in 
Wales.7 This provides a means of examining whether knowledge levels are higher among those 
who source at least some news from Welsh sources. A self-reported measure of respondents’ 
likelihood to vote is included to test whether better-informed citizens are more likely to vote. 
We include a series of party identification dummy variables, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent was contacted by any party during the election campaign up until the 
the point at which the survey was administered. 
 
On the whole, the findings belie our expectations that several factors are linked with higher 
knowledge levels. The only variables for which there is a clear effect on knowledge levels 
across all four models relate to interest in politics and propensity to vote in devolved elections. 
Those reporting a higher level of interest in politics and those who claim they are more likely 
to vote assign responsibility more accurately, both in terms of the division of competences and 
the partisan composition of the Welsh Government. In contrast to findings obtained in Northern 
Ireland (Garry, 2014), we find that those who know less about devolved politics are less likely 
to vote at devolved elections. 
 
                                               
7 This does not take into account any online news media generated in Wales since the survey 
data does not enable us to create a reliable measure in relation to this issue. 
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There is no indication that socio-demographic factors such as age, housing status, or children 
in the household has an affect on the accuracy of attributions. Those who have been educated 
to university level are no more likely to be able to identify the division of competences between 
the UK and the devolved levels; however, they are more likely to be able to identify that Labour 
was in government, and that Labour governed alone. Reflecting the widespread finding that 
women are less knowledgeable about politics than men (Dolan, 2011), Models 3 and 4 identify 
that women are less likely than men to identify that Labour was in government, and that it 
governed alone. However, the findings do not suggest that women are less likely to correctly 
assign policy responsibility. The attributions of women who do not live in a household with 
children are just as accurate as those of men. Model 1 and Model 3 suggest that married people 
and those with partners were less likely to be able to assign responsibility correctly, although 
Models 2 and 4 do not identify a similar trend. 
 
In terms of the variables relating to identity and the experience of living in Wales, those who 
speak at least some Welsh are no more knowledgeable than non-Welsh speakers. In contrast to 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014a) and Johns’ (2011) findings in other multi-level contexts, we identify 
no link between respondents’ preferred constitutional status and their ability to assign 
responsibility correctly. While Model 3 indicates that those who have a stronger Welsh identity 
are more likely to identify that Labour governed alone than British identifiers, none of the other 
three models indicate that there is any meaningful differences between respondents from these 
two categories. Those born in Wales are no more likely to assign policy competence correctly 
than those who have moved to Wales later in life. However, interestingly, those who were born 
outside Wales are more likely to be able to identify that Labour was in government, and that 
Labour governed alone, than respondents who were born in Wales. This finding is unexpected 
and may be explained by the fact that the differences between Wales and the rest of the UK 
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may be more starkly noticeable for those who have lived both in Wales and in other parts of 
the UK.  
 
A highly noteworthy finding is that consumption of any news media generated in Wales has 
no effect on the accuracy of attributions, in contrast to findings obtained in other settings 
(Cutler, 2017; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). This presents a challenge to the claim that the 
main cause of the limited awareness of devolved governance in Wales is the low consumption 
of indigenous Welsh news media. The finding that those who consume Welsh media are no 
more knowledgeable about devolution than those who do not suggests that knowledge levels 
would change little even if more people were to consume indigenous Welsh news media. 
 
There is no evidence that those who identify with any of the six parties examined are better 
able to identify the partisan composition of the WG than non-identifiers. Conservative and 
Plaid voters are more likely to accurately attribute responsibility for policy competences, and 
there is inconsistent evidence that the same applies for Liberal Democrat voters. Model 1 
indicates that those who were contacted by any party are more likely to attribute responsibility 
for policy competences more accurately, although that pattern does not emerge in Model 2 
(which specifically deals with two key devolved areas). There is no indication that those who 
have been contacted by a political party during the campaign are better placed to identify the 
partisan composition of the WG. This may suggest that parties are not doing enough during the 
election campaign to inform the public of which party (or parties) is responsible for policy 
performance. 
 
If the solution to the problem identified in the previous section – limited knowledge – is to take 
steps to improve public understanding of devolution, the findings presented in this section 
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provide no clear solution as to where such efforts should be targeted. Few groups within the 
population are identified as being less knowledgeable than others. The main pattern identified 
is that those with a greater interest in politics and those who are more likely to vote are more 
knowledgeable. This suggests that it is those who are most difficult to reach (i.e. those who are 
least interested in politics) are those that need reaching the most. It also indicates that those 
who are less politically engaged are not only less likely to vote, but also less likely to be able 
to use their vote well. Finally, the findings suggest that increasing the consumption of news 
media created in Wales may not be as effective a strategy to improve public understanding of 
devolution as many claim. 
 
 [Table 3] 
 
5. Responsibility attributions and electoral behaviour in Wales 
So far we have examined one specific aspect of the health of electoral accountability in Wales: 
whether citizens possess sufficient information to hold those in power to account. In this 
section we examine a separate aspect: whether voters in Wales use their vote to punish or 
reward those they believe are in power, even if they are operating on the basis of inaccurate 
information. In other words, we examine whether responsibility attributions have a moderating 
effect on vote choice, taking into account who the voter believes had been in power. If 
retrospective voting operates in Wales, the problem is solely one of knowledge, and the remedy 
must focus on increasing public awareness of devolution. However, if performance evaluations 
do not shape electoral behaviour, then devolved elections in Wales are undermined by a dual 
problem: that citizens have neither the information nor the inclination to use their ballot to hold 
those in power to account. 
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We examine this issue in two ways. First, we consider whether voters engage in retrospective 
voting by rewarding or punishing those they believe are in government on the basis of 
performance evaluations. This provides a means of testing whether voters may still attempt to 
vote retrospectively, but reward or sanction the incorrect party (Fortunato and Stevenson, 
2013). Second, we examine whether the most knowledgable voters – those who could identify 
that Labour governend alone – vote retrospectively.  
 
The two logistic regression models reported in Table 4 take dependent variables that are based 
on actual constituency vote choice, and are estimated on the sample of respondents who voted.8 
The dependent variable used in Model 1 is a binary variable which identifies whether the 
respondent voted for one of the parties that they thought had been in government in Wales 
during the previous term. Model 1 is specified in the same way as the models presented in 
Section 2, apart from the addition of two independent variables which account for respondents’ 
performance evaluation of health and education. The respondents were asked if they thought 
the standard of healthcare in the NHS and the standard of education had fallen, with higher 
scores indicating that the respondent thought that the standard had fallen.  These are the two 
variables that are of key interest for us: a positive and statistically significant effect would 
indicate that citizens draw on performance evaluations when deciding how to vote. For Model 
2, a binary dependent variable which identifies whether the respondent voted for Labour or for 
any of the other parties is used. The model is specified as Model 1, with three additions: a 
dummy variable indicating knowledge of Labour being in government at all, and interaction 
terms between this knowledge variable and policy assessments in health and education. We are 
particularly interested in whether there is an interaction between being aware that Labour 
                                               
8 These variables are taken from the post-election wave of WES (Wave 3), and standard 
survey weights are applied. The exclusion of non-voters and between-wave attrition account 
for the smaller sample size than that used in the previous section.  
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governed alone and evaluations of health and/or education. An interaction would indicate that 
the best-informed citizens draw on performance evaluations when deciding how to vote; the 
converse finding would indicate that even the best-informed citizens do not vote 
retrospectively. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The key finding that emerges from these models is that retrospective voting is not a discernible 
feature of electoral behaviour in Wales, at least not in relation to the two key devolved issues 
of health and education. Voters in Wales do not draw on their evaluations of government 
performance in these two policy areas when voting, and cast their ballots to sanction or reward 
those they believe are in government. The typical voter is just as likely to vote for a governing 
party whether or not they approve of the government’s record on health and education. Even 
more knowledgeable voters, those who can identify that Labour governed alone, do not vote 
retrospectively. These voters, again, are just as likely to vote for or against Labour regardless 
of what they think about the government’s performance in these two key policy areas. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A key rationale for creating elected institutions at the devolved level in Wales in 1999 was to 
strengthen accountability. Yet claims that there remains an accountability deficit in Wales 
remain prevalent. This study has explored the state of electoral accountability at the devolved 
level in Wales. We structured the investigation to reflect the notion that to use elections as a 
sanctioning mechanism citizens must be able to assign responsibility accurately and must vote 
retrospectively. We examined whether citizens can identify the key competences of devolved 
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policy-makers, what factors underpin their ability to do so, and whether voters draw on their 
evaluations of governmental performance when voting. 
 
Our findings are as alarming as they are consistent. A surprisingly large proportion of citizens 
in Wales do not possess basic knowledge of devolved governance. A substantial minority are 
unable to identify key devolved policy areas, while the overwhelming majority cannot 
accurately identify the composition of the government. Since few groups are identified as being 
less knowledgeable than others, it will take more to address these problems than simply 
targeting specific groups within the population. It is the least engaged politically that find the 
task of attributing responsibility most challenging, and this group may be the hardest to reach. 
Crucially, Welsh voters do not appear to draw on their evaluations of government performance 
when voting. Voters are just as willing to vote for a party they believe are in government 
regardless of whether they are satisfied with government performance. Even more 
knowledgeable voters, those who can identify the partisan composition of the government, do 
not vote retrospectively. In short, there is an acute accountability deficit at the devolved level 
in Wales. It stems from a twin problem: many citizens do not have the information required to 
hold those in power to account, and many do not use their vote to sanction poor performance. 
Retrospective voting is not a discernible feature of electoral behaviour in Wales.  
 
Beyond the study of electoral politics in Wales, the finding that Welsh elections fail to serve 
as a strong accountability mechanism has implications for understanding the pitfalls of 
decentralisation. Creating elected sub-state institutions will not automatically give rise to a 
healthy new democracy, in which there is a strong connection between governors and the 
governed. Accountability requires an attentive and an engaged public; it requires citizens who 
are ready to act on their evaluations of government performance by sanctioning or rewarding 
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those in power on election day. Establishing elected institutions does not guarantee that 
democracy will flourish, especially if citizens are unwilling to use elections as an accountability 
mechanism. 
 
This study also provides significant insights for scholars working on issues relating to 
responsibility attributions and multi-level governance. Exploring new terrain, we have 
identified another sub-state setting in which citizens struggle to attribute responsibility 
accurately and in which attributions do not moderate the effect of policy evaluations on vote 
choice. Our finding that knowledge of the partisan composition of government is extremely 
limited in Wales serves as a reminder (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013) that scholars should not 
take for granted that citizens know which party or parties are in government, even in settings 
featuring single-party governments. The study provides further evidence that consumption of 
relevant news media does not always facilitate understanding of governance (cf. Hobolt and 
Tilley, 2014a; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Cutler, 2017). Further work is required to 
identify how the institutional context, the focus of the media, and the nature of elections shape 
the ability of citizens to attribute responsibility.  
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Table 1: Policy responsibility attributions (Wave 2, pre-election) 
Statistic UK Wales Other DK N 
Health  18.1% 64.4% 2.4% 18.1% 2,277 
Education 13.6% 58.6% 10.6% 17.2% 2,277 
Law and order  47.4% 29.3% 4.5% 18.8% 2,277 
Foreign policy  77.5% 1.9% 5.4% 15.2% 2,277 
Taxation 78.1% 3.9% 2.8% 15.1% 2,277 
 
 
Table 2: Respondents’ identification of parties in government and government 
composition in Wales. 
Parties with ministers in government 
Conservatives 34.0% 
Green Party 5.8% 
Labour 60.8% 
Liberal Democrats 24.3% 
Plaid Cymru 41.4% 
UKIP 4.1% 
Don’t know 28.8% 
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- 
 
Labour in government alone 16.0% 
Labour in government, but in coalition 44.6% 
Some form of coalition9 45.7% 
N 2277 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Modelling political knowledge 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Knowledge of 
division of 
competences 
Knowledge of 
devolved 
competences 
Knowledge that 
Labour governed 
alone 
Knowledge that 
Labour governed 
(alone or in 
coalition) 
 
Poisson Poisson logistic Poisson 
 
1 2 3 4 
Age -0.011 (0.024) -0.055 (0.039) 0.020 (0.118) 0.028 (0.049) 
Age (sq) 0.0005 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.0004 (0.002) -0.0004 (0.001) 
Age (cubed) -0.00000 
(0.00000) 
-0.00001* (0.00001) 0.00000 (0.00002) 0.00000 (0.00001) 
AB 0.055 (0.040) 0.028 (0.064) 0.145 (0.206) 0.084 (0.082) 
C1 -0.020 (0.037) -0.034 (0.060) 0.267 (0.190) 0.090 (0.076) 
C2 -0.010 (0.041) -0.019 (0.067) -0.003 (0.223) 0.090 (0.086) 
Homeowner 0.041 (0.036) 0.077 (0.059) -0.006 (0.183) 0.055 (0.074) 
Higher 
education 
0.021 (0.029) 0.055 (0.047) 0.410*** (0.149) 0.161*** (0.059) 
Married or 
partnered 
-0.050* (0.030) -0.034 (0.049) -0.326** (0.155) -0.084 (0.062) 
                                               
9 Any type of coalition – regardless of whether Labour is included. 
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Woman -0.057 (0.064) 0.050 (0.104) -1.010*** (0.347) -0.362*** (0.132) 
No children in 
household 
0.099** (0.049) 0.114 (0.082) 0.012 (0.229) -0.007 (0.095) 
Born in Wales 0.017 (0.035) -0.017 (0.056) -0.321* (0.175) -0.109 (0.070) 
Welsh lang. 
ability 
0.016 (0.024) 0.026 (0.039) 0.046 (0.122) 0.060 (0.049) 
More British 
than Welsh 
0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.006) -0.030* (0.018) -0.009 (0.007) 
Wales: pref. 
constitutional 
status 
0.001 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) 
Greens (id) 0.065 (0.083) 0.141 (0.133) -0.667 (0.477) -0.029 (0.172) 
UKIP (id) -0.020 (0.055) 0.004 (0.091) -0.248 (0.285) -0.117 (0.116) 
Plaid Cymru (id) 0.085 (0.056) 0.147 (0.090) -0.271 (0.284) -0.057 (0.114) 
LibDem (id) 0.132** (0.064) 0.143 (0.105) -0.112 (0.335) 0.022 (0.133) 
Labour (id) 0.037 (0.040) 0.053 (0.066) -0.029 (0.199) 0.044 (0.081) 
Conservative 
(id) 
0.079* (0.043) 0.159** (0.070) -0.184 (0.223) 0.009 (0.089) 
Any Welsh 
media 
consumed 
0.009 (0.029) 0.041 (0.048) 0.058 (0.150) 0.005 (0.060) 
Interest in 
politics 
0.082*** (0.018) 0.087*** (0.030) 0.234** (0.096) 0.151*** (0.038) 
Contacted by 
any party 
0.025 (0.028) 0.059 (0.045) 0.296** (0.142) 0.114** (0.057) 
Likely to vote 0.026*** (0.006) 0.027*** (0.009) 0.089*** (0.032) 0.070*** (0.013) 
Woman*No 
children in 
household 
-0.015 (0.070) -0.106 (0.114) 0.127 (0.379) 0.137 (0.145) 
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Constant 0.966*** (0.373) 0.548 (0.602) -1.791 (1.822) -1.078 (0.765) 
     
Observations 1,781 1,781 1,781 1,781 
Log Likelihood -2,886.22 -2,062.01 -616.858 -1,682.44 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,826.45 4,178.01 1,287.72 3,418.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Modelling political accountability 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Vote for party respondent 
thought was in government 
Voted Labour 
(incumbent) 
 
1 2  
Age 0.232 (0.166) 0.444** (0.207) 
Age (sq) -0.004 (0.004) -0.008* (0.004) 
Age (cubed) 0.00002 (0.00002) 0.00004 (0.00003) 
AB -0.042 (0.294) 0.579 (0.371) 
C1 -0.079 (0.270) -0.274 (0.344) 
C2 -0.024 (0.306) -0.105 (0.393) 
Homeowner 0.608** (0.268) -0.567 (0.347) 
Higher education 0.415** (0.209) -0.026 (0.274) 
Married or partnered 0.054 (0.231) 0.228 (0.295) 
Woman 0.082 (0.202) -0.177 (0.263) 
No children in household 0.382 (0.281) -0.113 (0.354) 
Born in Wales -0.046 (0.250) -0.306 (0.336) 
Welsh lang. ability 0.073 (0.171) 0.170 (0.223) 
More British than Welsh -0.015 (0.025) -0.045 (0.034) 
Wales: pref. constitutional status 0.007* (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) 
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Greens (id) 1.605 (1.033) 1.157 (0.889) 
UKIP (id) -2.000*** (0.630) -2.530** (1.061) 
Plaid Cymru (id) 0.345 (0.371) -2.223*** (0.570) 
LibDem (id) 0.312 (0.432) -0.666 (0.538) 
Labour (id) 1.300*** (0.306) 2.647*** (0.345) 
Conservative (id) 0.340 (0.340) -1.169** (0.463) 
Any Welsh media consumed 0.249 (0.222) -0.557* (0.29) 
Interest in politics 0.059 (0.134) 0.136 (0.181) 
Contacted by any party 0.050 (0.201) -0.099 (0.262) 
Likely to vote 0.242*** (0.074) 0.026 (0.103) 
NHS: standard fallen -0.223 (0.145) 0.029 (0.464) 
Education: standard fallen -0.076 (0.153) -0.201 (0.454) 
Knowledge of Labour in gov. 
 
1.121 (1.198) 
Knowledge of Labour in gov. * NHS: standard 
fallen 
 
-0.400 (0.503) 
Knowledge of Labour in gov. * Education: 
standard fallen 
 
-0.145 (0.498) 
Constant -6.190** (2.719) -7.271** (3.419) 
Observations 754 754 
Log Likelihood -306.465 -205.995 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 668.929 473.99 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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